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ABSTRACT
INTERNATIONAL BANKING SECTOR LINKAGES: DID THE GLOBAL
FINANCIAL CRISIS STRENGTHEN OR WEAKEN THE LINKAGES?

James Edward Benton
Old Dominion University, 2012
Director: Dr. Mohammad Najand

This dissertation examines the interactions or linkages between the U.S. banking
sector and the other eight major banking center countries around the globe. I use the
national banking sector index for each country over a ten year period as a proxy for
reactions to external shocks and examine whether these shocks spillover from the U.S. to
the other major banking center countries as measured through their respective indices. I
examine both daily residual returns as well as return volatility to measure these
interactions between indices.
This study uses a vector auto-regression moving average (VARMA) as well as
Granger-causality Wald test to examine the linkages among the major banking sectors in
the international markets. For robustness I use a State Space analysis to test the linkages
among the nine major banking sector countries. My findings show that the U.S. national
banking sector has directional influence over the eight other major national banking
sectors including: France, Germany, Switzerland, U.K., Australia, Hong Kong, Japan,
and Canada. Furthermore, I find that the influence that the U.S. national banking sector
exerts on the other major banking sectors appears to diminish after the financial crisis
occurred on September 15, 2008.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

September 2008 marks a point in history that no one who studies and works in the
financial arena will soon forget. It will always be remembered as the “financial crisis”,
the point that saw many financial institutions close their doors and others surrendering to
low priced buyouts. A plethora of consolidations over the next couple of months with
enormous governmental intervention from around the world left many with a chill about
the financial future of many financial institutions if not the countries themselves and the
financial world as we know it.
The popular business news outlets then as well as now have made many
speculations as to the cause of this financial crisis as well as its effects on individual
firms and industries to whole economies. One such often stated effect is that U.S. banks
in general and the U.S. banking industry as a whole became much more volatile because
of the securitized mortgage backed securities that many U.S. banks held on their books.
Additionally, often cited is the impact that the U.S. banking industry had on the other
banking centers around the world. As the U.S. banking industry goes, so goes the rest of
the world banking community. The goal of this paper is to examine whether this popular
claim of U.S. banks and the U.S. banking sector specifically has more influence over the
banks and banking sectors of other industrialized countries during this time frame as well
as examining any linkages between the U.S. banking sector and the banking sectors of
other banking center economies.
The developed nations that are the major banking centers of the world already

have taken actions in recognition of the real or perceived linkages of the worldwide
banking system through the Basel Accords.

The Basel Accords are an affirmative

acknowledgement by the nine major banking countries of the world that the banking
industry is interconnected and truly global in nature and therefore, all banks need to be
governed by the same set of capital requirement rules.
The Basel Accords are agreements by participating countries regarding banking
regulations that are applied to all banks worldwide of those signatory countries. More
specifically, Basel I, II, 2.5, and III are agreements by the signatory countries regarding
the capital requirements by the banks within their countries. Basel I started the process
and was a very simplistic capital requirements agreement. Each subsequent Basel accord
has become more complex in the analysis of capital requirements with Basel III, the most
current accord, taking into consideration risk assessments and management of assets held
by the respective banks. Basel III accord made changes that are a direct result of the
financial crisis of 2008.
All nine of the countries in this study are signatory countries of all of the Basel
accords. Therefore, all banks within the nine counties of this study are required to meet
the minimum capital requirements of Basel I, II, and 2.5 with Basel III accord in various
stages of implementation in all nine countries.

However, each country has the

capabilities of exerting influence over its own banking sector through various
mechanisms individually.
To empirically test the popular claim that the U.S. banking sector has an
overwhelming influence on the rest of the global banking sectors I analyze the banking

sectors of the nine largest industrialized economies via their respective banking sector
indices to determine the causal linkages, speed or timing o f these linkages as well as the
strengths of any linkages. This study provides evidence that the U.S. national banking
sector does exert influence over the other major national banking sectors around the
globe. This influence is consistent over the entire period o f the study but it’s persistence
on the other major national banking sectors changed in various ways, depending on the
respective national banking sector, since the financial crisis occurred on September 15,
2008. These results have far reaching policy implications for bankers, investors and
researchers worldwide. They may also provide indications o f things to come in the future
regarding the U.S. influence in the global banking system.
The rest o f this paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the literature and
ideas that form the background for this study. Section III describes the research design
and data used.

Section IV presents my empirical results while section V provides a

discussion and conclusion.
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CHAPTER 2
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
There are two main streams of research that provides the theoretical support for
this research study design.

The first research stream is focused on international

transmission of stock market movements, international stock market linkages,
international stock market integration, and financial contagion. Over thirty years have
passed since the groundbreaking study by Eun and Shim (1989) documenting a
substantial degree of interdependence among national stock markets. Previous research
focused on intra-country stock price movement versus inter-country stock price
movement among national stock markets.
The popular financial media often over uses the phrase “financial contagion”,
most recently regarding the Greek and European Union financial situation and its impact
on other countries in the European Union.

However, they often fail to define what

“financial contagion” even means. They further fail to distinguish financial contagion
from “interdependence of financial markets” or “linkages o f financial markets”. This
was the focus of Karolyi (2003) in his survey article examining the various definitions,
taxonomies, and previous academic research in the area of International financial
contagion, interdependence and linkages.
Karolyi (2003) defines international financial linkages as co-movement of
international financial asset prices due to a natural free flow of investor-capital flows or
fundamental based co-movement. Karolyi (2003) further found two varying degrees of
what is termed “contagion”. Fundamental contagion which is the absence of strong

linkages but where rational investment decisions made by financial agents or rational
investor based co-movements. In other words, fundamental contagion is the investors’
reactions to financial opportunities and/or risks in the global markets. Additionally, there
is an irrational contagion that is sometimes seen as an increase in risk aversion, loss of
confidence, herd behavior, and/or full blown financial panic. He noted that both degrees
of contagion are more o f a phenomenon when markets such as exchange rates or stock
prices turn down. In other words, contagion is more of a panic on the downside rather
than on the upside. (Karolyi, 2003).
Prior to the late 1980s, academic research of international stock market linkages
were thought to be weak linkages at best.

Despite the various empirical techniques

employed, numerous studies generally found that (i) correlations among returns to
national stock markets were surprisingly low and (ii) national, not international, factors
play an important role in the return-generating process. (Eun and Shim, 1989)
Eun and Shim (1989) used a vector autoregression (VAR) methodology to
examine how much of the movements in one national stock market could be explained by
another, whether the United States stock market influenced other national stock markets,
and if one national stock market did influence another, how quickly the price movements
get transmitted to the other markets.
Since Eun and Shim (1989), the focus has shifted to studies regarding inter
country stock price co-movements among national stock markets. Eun and Shim (1989)
found that all of the eight largest European and Pacific Rim national securities markets
responded most strongly to U.S. shocks with a 1 day lag with most of the markets

responses to U.S. shocks completed within 2 trading days at most.
Arshanapalli and Doukas (1993) examined stock market linkages similar to Eun
and Ship (1989) but with a twist. Their analysis was limited to only five major stock
markets instead o f nine, they used a cointegration methodology to analyze linkages
among the markets and they were able to examine any changes of these linkages after a
major shock. Using a new technique at the time that followed a well specified error
correction model of cointegration by Engle and Granger (1987), they were able to avoid
filtering out potentially important information regarding long-run common trends among
non-stationary stock indices. (Arshanapalli and Doukas, 1993).
Arshanapolli and Doukas (1993) used the new cointegration technique to examine
the interdependence or linkage among five international stock markets: the U.S., the
U.K., France, Germany, and Japan both prior to as well as after the 1987 U.S. stock
market crash. They found a fairly weak interdependence among the five stock markets
pre-1987 crash and increased international co-movements among stock indices post1987 crash. They also found that the U.S. stock market had considerable impact on the
European stock markets of the U.K., France and Germany but not on the Japanese stock
market.
Masih and Masih (2002) later used both a VAR as well as cointegration
methodologies while adding the Granger-causality test to examine a post globalization
period of causal price transmission among national stock markets. Their results were
similar to Eun and Shim (1989) as well as Arshanapolli and Doukas (1993), the U.S.
stock market does influence the other major stock markets around the world.

The second stream of research is the interaction of major banking sectors or
individual banks and how financial shocks in one country, one major banking group, or a
number of major banks can spillover into other country banks, major banks, or banking
sectors.
Peek and Rosengren (1996) examined the financial shock transmission from
Japanese banks into the US banking system. Although their study did examine two major
banking center countries it was limited to examining stock market impacts, the financial
shock, on banking operations. This study is focused on the banking centers themselves
across all nine countries as well as the linkages among the banking centers.
Jokipii and Lucey (2006) examined the banking sector co-movement between the
three largest Central/Eastern European countries (CEEC) to determine if there were any
interdependence or linkages. Although they found some limited linkages, they used a
simple unadjusted correlation analysis and their study was limited to three intra-regional
small national banking sectors. What they were lacking in methodology and samples
they made up for in thought for an empirical study.
Chan-Lau, et al (2012) used an extreme value theory approach to examine
contagion risk across the international banking sectors. They did find that contagion risk
among the major global banks appears to have increased over time and that banks tend to
be more vulnerable to financial shocks during more volatile financial times than when
times are calm which support previous literature regarding contagion in general.
However, their study focuses on very large individual banks, 24 of the largest banking
groups around the world, rather then an aggregate approach by specific country banking
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sectors.
Hsiao (2012) used an extremal dependence model to identify and measure
financial shocks across international markets as well as country banking sectors. Hsiao
(2012) did use daily banking equity indices as I do but excluded several of the largest
banking center countries such as Japan and Switzerland.

Additionally, Hsiao (2012)

limited the period to an overall four year window.
Ongean, et al (2013) examined cross-border spillover affects through the banking
activities o f large multinational banks. They focused on 155 banks located in sixteen
different countries. They focused on the examining and measuring the changes of bank
lending behavior after the financial crisis. Although this examined cross-border reactions
it focused only on the banks and not the banking sectors as a whole in the different
countries.
Although there is a plethora of research studies focusing on contagion, linkages,
and/or interdependence among national stock markets either globally or regionally as
well as various research studies examining banking contagion and linkages in general,
there is a shortage of academic research examining similar linkages/interdependence
among individual industries or sectors within the national stock markets. Especially of
interest is the study of co-movements or interdependence among the largest national
banking centers in the world. In other words, empirical research to address the financial
media’s speculation of contagion or interdependence/linkages among the largest banking
sectors around the world and the ripple effects that may take place when a major financial
meltdown occurs. This study is an attempt to begin filling in this gap in the research.

CHAPTER 3
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
I used the proven theory that the U.S. stock market influences the other major
stock markets around the world with the expanding research stream of banking linkages.
Although the U.S. national stock market theory is more developed and empirically tested,
the banking linkages stream is still developing and is more regional in nature at this point
in time. Using similar empirical methodologies as the national stock market linkage
literature and adding an additional cutting edge methodology of State Space analysis, I
apply them to the interaction and influence transmission between the U.S. national
banking sector to the other major banking sectors around the world. From these two
streams o f research I propose three empirically testable hypotheses.
My first testable hypothesis stems from the question of what appears to happen to
the whole happening to the individual parts. In other words, if there is interdependence
among national stock markets does it hold that those same relationships will also be
evident in the underlying segments of the national stock markets as well? Here I look at
the largest sector of the respective national stock markets, the banking sectors.
Hypothesis 1: Given the proven linkages among national stock markets, would
banking sectors exhibit similar linkages as well?
As in Eun and Shim (1989) as well as Arshanapalli and Doukas (1993) that found
in their respective studies that the US stock market influences other major national stock
markets around the globe but they do not have a reciprocal effect on the US stock market.
Here I propose a second testable hypothesis to examine whether the US banking sector
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has a similar influence over the other major banking sectors around the globe. Is the US
a clear leader, follower or neither with regards to the other large banking center countries
around the globe.
Hypothesis 2: If there are linkages among national banking sectors then what role
does the U.S. banking sector play; does it lead, lag, or exhibit contemporaneous
moves with the other major banking sector countries?

Lastly, as in Arshanapalli and Doukas (1993) my third hypothesis centers around
change after a financial or market shock. I propose a third testable hypothesis of whether
the interdependence and influence among the national banking sectors, if any, that was
noted prior to the 2008 financial meltdown changes post 2008 financial meltdown.
Hypothesis 3: All else being equal if there is a linkage of national banking sectors
among the largest national banking sector countries, how did the intensity of this
linkage change after the global financial crisis that occurred on September 15,
2008?
These three empirically testable hypotheses should give a clear indication as to
the global linkages between the U.S. national banking sector and the eight other global
banking center countries, what role the U.S. national banking sector plays, that o f a
leader, laggard or contemporaneous member, and whether there is a noticeable change if
any in the linkages immediately following the financial crisis.
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CHAPTER 4
METHODOLOGY & DATA

4.1 EMPIRICAL MODELS
To fully test and evaluate the hypotheses articulated previously, I estimate a ninenation banking sector vector-autoregressive moving average (VARMA) using the log of
the daily rates of return on the respective national banking indices from January 4, 1999
through September 26, 2010. Additionally, I estimate a nine-nation banking VARMA
pairwise analysis using the log of the daily rates of return squared to evaluate the
volatility over the same periods. Lastly, as a robustness test, I run a state space model of
the daily rates o f return as well as the volatility over the same time periods. The nine
national banking indices included in this study are four representing European countries:France, Germany, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom; three representing Pacific Rim
countries:

Australia, Hong Kong, and Japan; and two representing North American

countries: Canada and the United States.
The vector-autoregressive moving

average (VARMA) analysis

estimates

unrestricted reduce form equations that have uniform sets of lagged dependent variables
of every equation as regressors. The VARMA thus estimates a dynamic simultaneous
equation system, free from a priori restrictions on the structure of relationships. Since no
restrictions are imposed on the structural relationships among variables, the VARMA can
be viewed as a flexible approximation to the reduced form of the correctly specified but
unknown model of the actual economic structure.

Considering that the large-scale

structural models are very often misspecified, it seems to be appealing to use the
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VARMA for the purpose of stylizing empirical regularities among time-series data.
VARMA models forecasting time-series variables have recently been shown to be much
more accurate than the more simple VAR (vector autoregressive) models alone.
Athanasopoulos (2008). A VAR model was used by Eun and Shim (1989).
The VARMA procedure provides a Granger-Causality test to determine the
Granger-causal relationships between two distinct groups of variables. It also provides
• infinite order AR representation
• impulse response function (or infinite order MA representation)
• decomposition of the predicted error covariances
• roots of the characteristic functions for both the AR and MA parts to evaluate
the proximity of the roots to the unit circle
• contemporaneous relationships among the components of the vector time series
The Granger-Causality test provides a clear directional linkage between the
national banking sector indices with the main focus being on the causal linkage between
the United State banking index and the other eight national banking sector indices. Once
the nine-nation banking sector VARMA system is estimated, I can trace out the dynamic
responses of each of the nine indices to innovations in a particular index using the
simulated responses of the estimated VARMA system. This provides a persistence or
strength of the linkage among the linkages.
The state space procedure is a suitable methodology for finding the best (in the
Granger causality sense) relationship among the above variables. The procedure has two
important attributes found lacking in similar methodologies. One advantage is that the
state space procedure makes no a priori assumptions about variable relationships, but

relies upon the data in identifying causal relationships. Stated differently, the procedure
allows a test of the hypothesized relationships without imposing a structural model on the
data prior to estimation. In contrast, autoregressive moving average (ARMA) and vector
autoregressive moving average (VARMA) models developed by Tiao and Box (1981)
require the researcher to tentatively specify the model before estimation. As compared to
the state space procedure, VARMA is unnecessarily restrictive when the direction of
causal relationships is uncertain.
A second advantage of the procedure is that it can be used to obtain the minimum
number of parameters necessary to span the state space o f the time invariant linear
relationship, which best describes a given set of observations. In other words, state space
models are parsimonious.

Additionally, Watson (1989) argues that, in state space

modeling, the constraint that the model places on the data is transparent.- He also assertsthat in state space modeling, an algebraic solution to the model is unnecessary since the
model is easily solved recursively by Kalman filter. Aoki and Havenner (1989) maintain
that the state space modeling is superior since there is no need for the judgmental modelselection rules employed by other methods (e.g. ARMA).
The methodology for constructing state space models consists of three steps (see
Aoki and Havenner 1991). The first step is fitting a multivariate autoregressive (AR)
model with k lags (AR(k)). This study uses the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) with
k=l,...10 to find a definitive starting point for the Yule-Walker equations.1

1 The Akaike Information Criterion considers the relationship between k-lags in the initial Yule-W alker
equations, where k =l,...n , and the resulting autocovariances in selecting an optimal starting point for the
initial sample period [See Akaike (1976)]. The optimal k-lag structure is that which m inim izes the
equations' prediction error relative to the number o f parameters used.
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The initial' measurement equation relates an m x 1 state space vector, qt, to the
multivariate time series, yt:

Yt = Htqt + dt + Ot8t t=l,..,T

(l)

where Ht is an n x m transition matrix , dt is an n x 1 vector, and <o, is an n x 1 vector of
serially uncorrelated disturbances, E(et) = 0, While the state vector <;t spans the time
series, the distributional properties of yt are largely unknown, making parameter
estimation difficult.

Some properties may be ascertained by decomposing the state

vector's prediction error.
In the final step of the methodology, the Kalman filter (i.e., forward recursion
algorithms) is used to compute the one-step-ahead prediction error, (Dt, and its
corresponding covariance matrix. This information is used in constructing an appropriate
likelihood function (see Diebold (1989) for a more complete discussion of this approach).
Maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) is then used to derive final parameter estimates
for the state space model. The state space estimates are then converted to VARMA form
to facilitate interpretation o f the results.2
4.2 DATA SAMPLE
Keeping in the spirit of the core study of linkages as examined in Eun and Shim
(1989), this study concentrates on a number of the world’s largest banking sectors as
2 A ll vector ARM A m odels can be expressed in state space form. Aoki and Havenner (1 9 9 1 ) show that the
Cayley-Hamilton theorem can be invoked to eliminate states and convert state space m odels to ARM A
m o d els. The m eth o d in volves recursive su b stitu tion o f th e lag (back shift) o p era to r m atrix and p ro d u ces a
num b er o f lags in all p aram eters.
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determined by Thomson Reuters which is based on aggregate bank assets within the
respective countries.

In Eun and Shim (1989), they selected and analyzed the nine

countries with the largest stock market indices based on market capitalization at the time.
Using The Banker magazine published by Thomson Reuters I selected the same
nine countries for this study. Eight of the nine countries from Eun and Shim (1989) are
the largest banking sector countries today with Canada being the lone exception. Canada
is still included due to its close ties to the US banking sector and strong intra-regional
ties. Here, as in Eun and Shim (1989), I use the major banking indices traded in each
country as a proxy for the banking sector from the respective country.

This is to

minimize the individual banking requirements that are imposed in the various banking
jurisdictions, as well as focusing on the overall sectors instead of individual banks.
These banking sectors are: U.K., Germany, France and Switzerland representing
Europe; Japan, Hong Kong and Australia representing the Pacific Rim; and Canada and
the U.S. representing North America. Each country banking sector is represented by a
equity banking index as a proxy for that country specific banking sector. U.K. (FTSE
All-Share Bank Index), Germany (Germany CD AX Banks Price Index), France (Euronex
Paris CAC Bank 8350), Switzerland (SWXICB Bank Price Index), Japan (Japan TOPIX
Banks), Hong Kong (Hang Seng Financial Index), Australia (S&P/ASX 200 Banking
Index), Canada (Canada S&P/TSX Banks), and the U.S. (S&P 500 Banks).
The database used in this study consists of time series of daily national banking
sector indices at closing time, in terms of local currency units. The nine national banking
sector indices daily closing data were obtained from the Global Financial Data database
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for the entire period beginning January 4, 1999 and ending September 24, 2010. The
sample was limited to the time frame in which all of the nine national banking sector
indices were in existence and traded in a public market. There were a total of 3,054 daily
closes for each o f the national banking sector indices for the inclusive period of January
4, 1999 through September 24, 2010.
Additionally, the data samples were broken down to include the entire period
prior to the financial crisis on September 15, 2008 and the two-year time frame after the
financial crisis. The time frame included prior to the financial crisis date of September
15, 2008 runs from January 4, 1999 through September 12, 2008 (September 12, 2008
was a Friday). This first time frame consisted of 2,525 daily closes for each of the
national banking sector indices. The second time frame included the two years after the
financial crisis date of September 15, 2008 which included September 15, 2008 through
September 14, 2010.

The second time frame consisted of 529 daily closes for each of

the national banking sector indices. The statistical analysis of the immediate two-year
time frame prior to the financial crisis was substantially similar to the inclusive time
period prior to the financial crisis. Although this inclusive time frame is much larger in
comparison to the limited two-year time frame that followed the financial crisis, this only
adds robustness to the analysis.
One issue that was addressed regarding the daily close across nine different
national banking sector indices was differing trading days.

In other words, not all

national banking sector indices or national securities markets in which they are traded are
traded on a daily basis due to varying national holiday schedules. Therefore, to provide
for adequate comparisons of indices in this study there were some minor transformations
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made to the raw daily close data of the national banking sector indices included in the
inclusive periods. For any day that any of the national banking sector indices was traded
and therefore provided a daily close, then all of the other indices must also have a daily
close. This was to ensure the same number of daily closes across all nine national
banking sector indices.
In other words, when national stock exchanges were closed due to national
holiday, banking holiday, severe weather, or other national emergency or event, the
national banking sector index was assumed to remain the same as the previous active
trading day close.
For example, the U.S. national securities markets as well as various other national
securities markets are closed on December 25 of each year but the Japanese national
securities markets are open. Therefore, since the national banking sector index for Japan
has an actual daily close for December 25th the other national banking sector indices
must also have a daily close for December 25th. The solution is to assume the daily close
for the US national banking sector index on December 24th and use that daily close for
the following day of December 25th.
These national banking sector indices are then transformed to log of daily rates of
return as well as log of return volatility (daily returns squared), which are then used in
our VARMA, Granger-Causality, and State Space analysis.

Any potential problems

associated with non-stationarity in the original banking sector indices can be alleviated by
using the transformed data. There is a non-synchronous trading problem. Differences in
trading times, whether national securities markets are open and trading in contrast with
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other national securities markets, and crossing of various time zones.

***Insert Table 1 here, Summary Statistics for Residual Returns***

Table 1 provides a listing of the nine national banking sector indices by country, a
detailed description of the nine indices variables as well as the summary statistics of the
residual returns variables for the nine indices that were used for the empirical test using
Granger-Causality, VARMA and State Space modeling in this study. As can be clearly
seen in this table, the U.S. national banking sector index for residual daily returns
exhibited the lowest mean return while Canada exhibited the highest mean return during
the overall period of this study.

***Insert Table 2 here, Summary Statistics for Returns Volatility***

Table 2 provides a listing of the nine national banking sector indices by country, a
detailed description of the nine indices variables as well as the summary statistics of the
returns volatility variables for the nine indices that were used for the empirical test using
Granger-Causality, VARMA and State Space modeling in this study. As can be clearly
seen in this table, the U.S. national banking sector index for daily return volatility
exhibited the highest daily return volatility while Australia exhibited the lowest daily
return volatility during the overall period of this study.
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CHAPTER 5

EMPIRICAL RESULTS
I limited the lag length of this empirical VARMA analysis in this study to three
lags or three trading days. Although this study of national banking sector indices is not
an exact comparison of Eun and Shim (1989) its striking similarity noted in the lag length
is evident. Eun and Shim (1989) found evidence of feedback to current stock market
index returns of up to 3 trading days or 3 lags. Here, over 30 years later, although
analyzing a different set of indices, I found no significant feedback of returns between
indices greater than 3 lags or 3 trading days. Therefore, all of the statistical analysis and
results are based on the VARMA with lag of 3 trading days. This in and of itself is
something to be noted.
5.1 RESIDUAL RETURNS
I empirically test here the residual returns time series on a pairwise basis between
the U.S. national banking sector index and the other eight major banking center countries
respectively.

***Insert Table 3 here, Correlation Matrix for Residual Returns***

Table 3 shows the results of the contemporaneous correlations of the residual
returns among the nine national banking sector indices.

There are no surprises here.

Table 3 shows, as in Eun and Shim (1989) regarding national stock markets, the intraregional pairwise correlation of the nine country indices of returns tend to be much higher
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than those of inter-regional correlations. The four European country national banking
indices consisting of France, Germany, Switzerland, and the U.K., exhibit very high
pairwise contemporaneous correlations ranging from .67842 to .73978.

Also the

respective Pacific Rim national banking sector indices o f Australia, Hong Kong and
Japan exhibit likewise, very high pairwise contemporaneous correlations ranging from
.34301 to .43532. Although the correlations of the Pacific Rim countries are lower than
those of the European countries, they are still statistically significant.
As was also expected, the Canadian and the U.S. national banking sector indices
for returns showed a higher contemporaneous correlation o f .53147. Additionally, the
U.S. national banking sector index had a much higher contemporaneous correlation with
the four European countries in this study ranging from .35757 to .40695 compared to the
correlations with the three Pacific Rim countries which ranged from .0317 with Japan to
.09045 of Australia. This could be attributed to several factors such as correspondingly
similar trading times due to common time zones as well as closeness or integration of the
intra-regional economies.
The pairwise contemporaneous correlations of the nine country national banking
sector indices for returns of this study are much higher than was found in the study of the
linkages of the national stock markets by Eun and Shim (1989). This indicates that the
banking sectors are highly correlated on a global scale. This provides initial evidence
that the global banking community is linked and is influenced by as well as influences
other national banking sectors. This lends initial support to hypothesis one in this study
that there are linkages among the nine largest national banking sectors regardless of
differences in national banking regulations.
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5.2 CAUSATION AND DIRECTIONAL INFLUENCE OF RESIDUAL RETURNS
The Granger-Causality Wald test is used in this study to provide evidence of
causal connections between the U.S. national banking sector and the other eight country
national banking sectors.

This test of directional causation or influence is used as a

pairwise analysis, comparing the U.S. national banking sector index to the other country
national banking sector indices individually. This analysis provides evidence supporting
the second hypothesis of whether the U.S. national banking sector is a leader, follower or
contemporaneously influenced sector compared to the other major national banking
sectors respectively. Table 4 through table 6 show the results of the Granger-Causality
Wald test as a part of the VARMA analysis.

***Insert Table 4 here, Granger-Causality Wald Test for Residual Returns,
Pacific Rim Countries***

Table 4 shows the Granger-Causality Wald test results between the U.S. national
banking sector index for returns and the three respective Pacific Rim countries of
Australia, Hong Kong, and Japan respectively.

The null hypothesis for Granger-

Causality test is that the first variable (Australia) is influenced by itself not by the second
variable (U.S.).

The null hypothesis is rejected for all cases in this table. Panel A

indicates that the U.S. national banking sector index influences each o f the respective
Pacific Rim country national banking sector indices as evidenced by the extremely high
Chi-Square for each country for the entire period of this study all o f which were
statistically significant, January 4, 1999 through September 24, 2010.

Panel B also

shows similar results for the period prior to the financial crisis. This period is from the
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beginning of the data sample of January .4, 1999 through September 12, 2008. The entire
period prior to the financial crises date o f September 15, 2008 and not just the two years
prior was used since the time period provided similar results as the two years only and
using the entire period therefore increase the robustness of the statistical results.
Continuing with Table 4 , 1 compare the Granger-Causality test results in Panel B,
results for the entire period prior to the financial crisis, to Panel C results for the period
after the financial crisis from September 15, 2008 through September 14, 2010.
Although the directional evidence is the same throughout the three periods showing that
the US national banking sector index for returns influence over the three respective
Pacific Rim country national banking sector indices, they in turn fail to show any
reciprocal feedback influence over the U.S. banking sector. The directional influence of
the U.S. national banking sector index over the three Pacific Rim country national
banking sector indices also appears to be weaker after the financial crisis as indicated by
the substantially lower Chi-Square.
The Chi-square for testing Granger-Causality between the U.S. national banking
sector index for returns and the Australian counterpart went from 490.08 for the period
prior to the financial crisis down to 118.45 for the period after the financial crisis, both
are statistically significant. There is a similar change in the Chi-square seen for testing
Granger-Causality between the U.S. national banking sector index for returns and Hong
Kong dropping from 502.81 prior to the financial crisis to 98.97 afterwards as well as
Japan dropping from 152.30 prior to the financial crisis down to 88.97 afterwards. Both
of these remain statistically significant.
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. *** Insert Table 5 here, Granger-Causality Wald Test for Residual Returns,
European Countries***

Table 5 shows the Granger-Causality Wald test results between the U.S. national
banking sector index and the four respective European countries of France, Germany,
Switzerland, and the U.K. As with prior analysis above, Panel A provides the results for
the inclusive period, Panel B provides the results for the entire period prior to the
financial crisis, and Panel C provides the results regarding the two-year period
immediately after the financial crisis. The evidence of the U.S. national banking sector
directional influence over the four European national banking sector is supported by the
extremely large Chi-Square for all by the Granger-Causality tests in both Panel A, the
entire study period as well as Panel B, the entire period prior to the financial crisis. Also
of note, as with the Pacific Rim country national banking sectors, none of the four
European country national banking sectors indicate directional influence over the US
national banking sector. However, as seen in the previous analysis of the Pacific Rim
countries, the U.S. directional influence is still evident during the two-years after the
financial crisis and as with the prior analysis, the U.S. national banking sector influence
over the four European national banking sectors appears to weaken during this period.
As observed with the change in Chi-square for the Granger-Causality test between
the US national banking sector index for returns and the Pacific Rim countries, there is a
notable change in the Chi-square in the Granger-Causality measure between the US
national banking sector index for returns and the four European banking center countries
in this study. The Chi-square dropped from the period prior to the financial crisis as
compared to the period observed after the financial crisis for all four European countries.
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France dropped from 409.20 down to 33.21, Germany from 176.91 down to 26.78,
Switzerland down from 349.88 down to 29.80 and the U.K. from 307.31 down to 37.90.
All remained statistically significant however.

***Insert Table 6 here, Granger-Causality Wald Test for Residual Returns,
North America***

Table 6 shows the results of the Granger-Causality Wald test between the U.S.
national banking sector index for returns and the national banking sector index for returns
of Canada. There is no surprise here due to their close intra-regional ties. The U.S.
national banking sector index clearly influences the Canadian national banking sector
index for the inclusive data sample period, the entire period prior to the financial crisis as
well as the period after the financial crisis as seen in Panel A, B, and C in Table 6
respectively. The Chi-Square was visibly lower as seen in Panel C of table 4 and table 5
after the financial crisis for the U.S. national banking sector influence over the three
Pacific Rim countries as well as the four European countries national banking sectors
respectively. However, Panel C of table 6 shows that the Chi-Square indicating causation
of the U.S. national banking sector influence on the Canadian national banking sector
increases after the financial crisis. These results also show that the Canadian national
banking sector does not influence the U.S. national banking sector.
Hypothesis 2 is clearly supported from the evidence found in the GrangerCausality tests above. The U.S. national banking sector has a statistically significant
directional influence on all eight of the other national banking center country sector
indices for returns in this study. Although it appears that the strength of this directional
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influence does dramatically weaken over the three Pacific Rim and four European
countries after the financial crisis occurs, evidence shows that it increases over the
Canadian banking sector.

5.3 PERSISTENCE OF LINKAGE AND DYNAMIC RESPONSE OF RESIDUAL
RETURNS
After determining the causal influence, the next step is to analyze the persistence
o f actual strength of the causal influence the U.S. national banking sector has over the
other eight national banking center country sectors in this study. Table 7 and Table 10
are included for additional information for the inclusive period of analysis and are not
significantly different from that of those of the inclusive period prior to the financial
crisis. Therefore, I will focus on the comparison between the strength of influence prior
to the financial crisis to that after the financial crisis and evaluate the changes between
these two periods.

***Insert Table 7 here, Model Parameter Estimates of Residual Returns for Overall
Period, Asia-Pacific Countries***

Findings provided in Table 7 of the U.S. national banking sector influence over
the Pacific Rim national banking center countries for the entire period of my study. The
U.S. exerts influence for a full three days over Australia, two days over Hong Kong but
only one day over Japan. These findings are all statistically significant.

***Insert Table 8 here, Model Parameter Estimates of Residual Returns for Period Prior
to Financial Crisis, Pacific Rim Countries***
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Table 8 indicates that the U.S. national banking sector persistence of influence
over the Australian and Hong Kong national banking sectors lasts for a full three trading
days for the period prior to the financial crisis. This is statistically significant out to three
trading days prior to the financial crisis but lasts only one trading day for the Japanese
national banking sector. These findings are very similar to the findings in Table 7 for the
entire period of this study.

***Insert Table 9 here, Model Parameter Estimates of Residual Returns for
Period after Financial Crisis, Pacific Rim Countries***

In Table 9, the findings indicate significant changes regarding the strength of
influence by the U.S. national banking sector over the Pacific Rim countries after the
financial crisis. The U.S. national banking sector strength persists for only one trading
day over the Australian national banking sector for the period after the financial crisis,
down from three trading days prior to the financial crisis. The U.S. national banking
sector persistence over the Hong Kong national banking sector drops to two trading days
for the period after the financial crisis compared to three trading days for the period prior
to the financial crisis. Lastly, the U.S. national banking sector remained unchanged at
one trading day of influence over the Japanese national banking sector for the period after
the financial crisis.

***Insert Table 10 here, Model Parameter Estimates of Residual Returns for Overall
Period, European Countries***

27

The findings in Table 10 provides evidence that the U.S. national banking sectors
influence over the four European national banking center countries for the entire period
of the study. The U.S. exerts a full two days of influence over all four of the European
countries in this study for the inclusive period of this study.

***Insert Table 11 here, Model Parameter Estimates o f Residual Returns for Period Prior
to Financial Crisis, European Countries***

Table 11 indicates that the U.S. national banking sector influence persists for two
trading days over the French and the U.K. national banking sectors but only for one
trading day over the Swiss and German national banking sectors prior to the financial
crisis. This is significantly similar to the results for the inclusive period of this study.
However, the U.S. national banking sector influence is down to only one trading day for
all four European country national banking sectors as indicated from the results in Table
12 .

***Insert Table 12 here, Model Parameter Estimates of Residual Returns for Period after
the Financial Crisis, European Countries***

The U.S. national banking sector persistence or influence over the three Pacific
Rim country and four European country national banking sectors appears to either remain
unchanged from the period prior to the financial crisis compared to the period after the
financial crisis such as for Japan* France, and Switzerland or decreases in influence in the
case of Australia, Hong Kong, Germany, and the U.K. Canada, however, appears to be
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an entirely different story.

***Insert Table 13 here, Model Parameter Estimates of Residual Returns,
North American Countries***

The findings in Table 13 provides evidence of the persistence or influence of the
U.S. national banking sector over the Canadian national banking sector for the inclusive
period of the study, the entire period prior to the financial crisis and the period after the
financial crisis as can be seen in Panel, A, B, and C respectively. Panel B shows that the
influence that the U.S. national banking sector has over the Canadian national banking
sector for the entire period prior to the financial crisis as merely one trading day.
However, this influence increases dramatically to three trading days for the period
immediately after the financial crisis. This is opposite from the reaction that occurred
with the Pacific Rim and European country national banking sectors. The U.S. national
banking sector appears to exert more influence over the Canadian national banking sector
after the financial meltdown occurred on September 15, 2008.
5.4 STATE SPACE ANALYSIS OF RESIDUAL RETURNS
***Insert Table 14 here, State Space Estimates of Linkages Among Banks Returns for
the Overall Period***

VARMA converted state space results for returns for the overall period are
reported in Table 14. Equation (1) indicates that Switzerland banks’ return is influenced
at lag one by Australia, Switzerland, France, United States, Canada, and Japan and
contemporaneously by Australia. A quick glance at Tables 14 indicates that the U.S. bank
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returns exert the most influence on all of other countries, while in turn, it is influenced by
Canada and to a small degree by France.
To conserve space, the results for the period before financial crisis are very
similar to the overall results and thus not reported here. Again, the U.S. is found to exert
the most influence on all other countries while it is influenced only by a small degree by
France and Germany.
The results for after the financial crisis indicate that the link between banks stock
returns have weakened dramatically as the governments took steps to protect their
financial systems. For instance - Switzerland, France, the United Kingdom, the United
States, Canada, Japan, and Australia were rarely influenced by the returns of other
countries - while Germany and Hong Kong experienced more pronounced influence by
other countries.3
5.5 RETURNS VOLATILITY
I empirically test here the returns volatility time series on a pairwise basis
between the US national banking sector index and the other eight major banking center
countries respectively.

***Insert Table 15 here, Correlation Matrix for Returns Volatility***

In Table 15 I provide the results of the contemporaneous correlations for the
returns volatility among the nine national banking sector indices. There are some noted

3 Results are available upon request.

differences from my; previous findings for residual returns. Table 16 shows, as in Eun
and Shim (1989) regarding national stock markets and my previous findings for residual
returns, the intra-regional pairwise correlation of this nine country indices for return
volatility tend to be much higher than those of inter-regional correlations. The four
European country national banking indices consisting of France, Germany, Switzerland,
and the U.K., exhibit very high pairwise contemporaneous correlations for return
volatility ranging from .61601 to .65721.

Also the respective Pacific Rim national

banking sector indices of Australia, Hong Kong and Japan exhibit likewise, very high
pairwise contemporaneous correlations for return volatility ranging from .30882 to
.33724. Although the correlations of the Pacific Rim countries are lower than those of
the European countries, they are still statistically significant as was seen for the
correlation o f the residual returns.
As was also expected, the Canadian and the U.S. national banking sector indices
for return volatility show a high contemporaneous correlation of .38523. This is much
lower than the returns correlation but is still statistically significant. Additionally, the
U.S. national banking sector index for return volatility had a much higher
contemporaneous correlation with the four European countries in this study ranging from
.33850 to .44023 compared to the correlations with the three Pacific Rim countries which
ranged from .10573 with Japan to .21347 of Australia. This range is significantly higher
than that noted for the U.S. and Pacific Rim countries and their contemporaneous
correlation of returns and is statistically significant. This could be attributed to several
factors as noted with the contemporaneous correlation of returns such as correspondingly
similar trading times due to common time zones as well as closeness or integration of the
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intra-regional economies.
The pairwise contemporaneous correlations of the nine country national banking
sector indices for return volatility as with the returns of this study are much higher than
was found in the study o f the linkages of the national stock markets by Eun and Shim
(1989). This indicates that the banking sectors are highly correlated on a global scale.
This provides further evidence that the global banking community is linked and is
influenced by as well as influences other national banking sectors. This lends initial
support to hypothesis one in this study that there are linkages among the nine largest
national banking sectors regardless of differences in national banking regulations.
5.6 CAUSATION AND DIRECTIONAL INFLUENCE OF RETURNS
VOLATILITY
The Granger-Causality Wald test is used in this study to provide evidence of
causal connections between the U.S. national banking sector volatility and the other eight
country national banking sectors return volatility. This test of directional causation or
influence is used as a pairwise analysis, comparing the U.S. national banking sector index
for return volatility to the other country national banking sector indices for volatility
individually.

This analysis provides evidence supporting the second hypothesis of

whether the U.S. national banking sector is a leader, a laggard or contemporaneously
influenced sector compared to the other major national banking sectors respectively.
Table 17 through table 19 provides the results of the Granger-Causality Wald test as a
part of the VARMA analysis.
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***Insert Table 16 here, Granger-Causality Wald Test for Returns Volatility,
Pacific Rim Countries***

The findings in Table 16 shows the Granger-Causality Wald test results between
the U.S. national banking sector index for returns volatility and the three respective
Pacific Rim countries of Australia, Hong Kong, and Japan respectively.

Panel A

provides evidence that the U.S. national banking sector index for return volatility
influences each of the respective Pacific Rim country national banking sector indices for
return volatility as noted by the Chi-Square for each country, all of which are statistically
significant for the entire period of this study, January 4, 1999 through September 24,
2010 .

It is interesting to note that the findings for return volatility that all three Pacific
Rim countries also influence the U.S. return volatility. Unlike the returns alone where
the US national banking sector influenced these countries but not vice versa, here I find
that the return volatility is a complete feedback loop, a reciprocity of influence with
return volatility.
Panel B also shows similar results for the period prior to the financial crisis. This
period is from the beginning of the data sample of January 4, 1999 through September
12, 2008. The entire period prior to the financial crises date of September 15, 2008 and
not just the two years prior was used since the time period provided similar results as the
two years only and using the entire period therefore increase the robustness of the
statistical results.
Continuing with Table 16, I compare the Granger-Causality Wald test results for
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return volatility in Panel B, results for return volatility of the entire period prior to the
financial crisis, to Panel C results for the period after the financial crisis from September
15, 2008 through September 14, 2010. Although the directional evidence is the same
throughout the overall period as well as the period showing that the U.S. national banking
sector index influence over the three respective Pacific Rim country national banking
sector indices and vice versa, the three Pacific Rim countries exerting directional
influence over the U.S. return volatility. The directional influence o f the U.S. national
banking sector index for return volatility over the three Pacific Rim country national
banking sector indices appears to disappear after the financial crisis except for its
directional influence over Australia. Any directional influence by the three Pacific Rim
countries over the U.S. national banking sector regarding return volatility has completely
disappeared.

***Insert Table 17 here, Granger-Causality Wald Test for Return Volatility,
European Countries***

The findings in Table 17 shows the Granger-Causality Wald test results between
the U.S. national banking sector index return volatility and the four respective European
countries o f France, Germany, Switzerland, and the U.K. As with prior analysis above,
Panel A provides the results for the inclusive period, Panel B provides the results for the
entire period prior to the financial crisis, and Panel C provides the results regarding the
two-year period immediately after the financial crisis. The evidence o f the U.S. national
banking sector return volatility directional influence over the other four European
national banking sector is evidenced by the Granger-Causality tests Chi-Square that is

statistically significant for all in both Panel A, the entire study period as well as Panel B,
the entire period prior to the financial crisis. Also noted, as with the Pacific Rim country
national banking sectors return volatility, all four of the European country national
banking sectors indicate directional influence over the U.S. national banking sector as
well. This indicates a more contemporaneous influence of return volatility among the
U.S. and European countries as I found among the U.S. and Pacific Rim countires.
However, as seen in the previous analysis of the Pacific Rim countries, the U.S.
directional influence as well as the European countries directional influence over the U.S.
all but disappears during the period immediately after the financial crisis. The exception
is the U.S. still has some direction influence over France and the U.K. while the U.K. still
has directional influence over the U.S.

***Insert Table 18 here, Granger-Causality Wald Test for Returns Volatility,
North America***
The findings in Table 18 show the results of the Granger-Causality Wald test
between the U.S. national banking sector index of return volatility and the national
banking sector index of return volatility for Canada. There is no surprise here due to
their close intra-regional ties. As noted regarding directional influences between the U.S.
and the Pacific Rim countries along with the U.S. and the European countries, the U.S.
national banking sector index of return volatility clearly influences the Canadian national
banking sector index of return volatility as well as vice versa, a contemporaneous
directional influence if you will, for the inclusive data sample period, the entire period
prior to the financial crisis as well as the period after the financial crisis as seen in Panel
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A, B, and C in Table 18 respectively.
The directional influence of the U.S. diminished greatly as seen in Panel C of
table 16 and table 17 after the financial crisis for the U.S. national banking sector
influence over the three Pacific Rim countries as well as the four European countries
national banking sectors respectively. However, Panel C of table 18 shows that the ChiSquare indicating causation o f the U.S. national banking sector influence on the Canadian
national banking sector remains statistically significant after the financial crisis. These
results also show that the Canadian national banking sector index of return volatility does
influence the U.S. national banking sector during all three periods of observation.
Hypothesis 2 is clearly supported from the evidence found in the GrangerCausality tests above. The U.S. national banking sector has a statistically significant
directional influence on all eight of the other national banking sectors in this study.
Although it appears that the strength of this directional influence does dramatically
weaken against the three Pacific Rim and four European countries after the financial
crisis occurs, evidence shows that it remains statistically significant over the Canadian
banking sector.

5.7 PERSISTENCE OF LINKAGE AND DYNAMIC RESPONSE OF RETURNS
VOLATILITY
After determining the causal influence, the next step is to analyze the persistence
of actual strength of the causal influence the U.S. national banking sector has over the
other eight national banking sectors in this study. Table 19 and Table 22 are included for
additional information for the inclusive period of analysis. However, I will focus on the
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comparison between the strength of influence prior to the financial crisis to that after the
financial crisis and evaluate the changes between these two periods.

***Insert Table 19 here, Model Parameter Estimates of Returns Volatility for Overall
Period, Pacific Rim Countries***
Table 19 provides evidence that the U.S. national banking sector index of return
volatility has influence over Australia and Japan that is statistically significant for one
day and three days but only for one day over Hong Kong for the overall period of this
study. This is slightly different from the observed findings when evaluating only the
period prior to the financial crisis. These results are similar to the results found for the
VARMA pariwise analysis between the U.S. national banking sector index for return
volatility and the three respective Pacific Rim countries.
***Insert Table 20 here, Model Parameter Estimates of Returns Volatility for Period
Prior to Financial Crisis, Pacific Rim Countries***

Table 20 indicates that the U.S. national banking sector index for return volatility
persistence of influence over the Hong Kong and Japan national banking sectors lasts a
full trading day. This is statistically significant out to three trading days prior to the
financial crisis but has statistically significant influence over Australia for one and three
trading days, but not for the second trading day.
***Insert Table 21 here, Model Parameter Estimates of Returns Volatility for
Period after Financial Crisis, Pacific Rim Countries***

The findings in Table :21 show significant changes regarding the strength of
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influence by the U.S. national banking sector for return volatility over the Pacific Rim
countries after the financial crisis. The U.S. national banking sector index for return
volatility strength persists for only one trading day over the Australian national banking
sector for the period after the financial crisis, down from two trading days prior to the
financial crisis. The U.S. national banking sector index for return volatility persistence
over the Hong Kong and Japan national banking sectors disappears altogether for the
period after the financial crisis compared to one trading day for the period prior to the
financial crisis.
***Insert Table 22 here, Model Parameter Estimates of Returns Volatility for Overall
Period, European Countries***

Table 22 provides results for the entire period of study for the VARMA pairwise
analysis between the U.S. national banking sector index for return volatility and the four
European countries respectively. Unlike the pairwise analysis between the U.S. national
banking sector and the three Pacific Rim countries where there was little significant
differences between the overall period and the less inclusive period prior to the financial
crisis. Here there are some differences that appear between the US national banking
sector index for return volatility and the four European countries when comparing the
overall period of observation and the period prior to the financial crisis.
During the overall period, the U.S. national banking sector index for return
volatility has a statistically significant influence over France, Switzerland, and the U.K.
for one trading period as well as the third trading day but not for the second trading day.
I observed that the U.S. national banking sector index for return volatility has no
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measurable influence over the German banking sector during this same time frame.
***Insert Table 23, Model Parameter Estimates of Returns Volatility for Period Prior to
Financial Crisis, European Countries***

Table 23 indicates that the U.S. national banking sector index for return volatility
statistically significantly influence persists for two trading days over the French and the
U.K. national banking sectors but only for one trading day for the Swiss and German
national banking sectors prior to the financial crisis. However, the U.S. national banking
sector index for return volatility greatly diminishes influence down to only one trading
day for the U.K. national banking sector and has completely disappeared over Germany,
France, and Switzerland as can be seen from the results in Table 24.

***Insert Table 24 here, Model Parameter Estimates of Returns Volatility for Period after
Financial Crisis, European Countries***

The U.S. national banking sector persistence or influence over the three Pacific
Rim country and four European country national banking sectors appears to either
diminish substantially from the period prior to the financial crisis compared to the period
after the financial crisis such as for Australia and the U.K. or completely disappears in
the case of Hong Kong, Japan, Germany, France, and Switzerland. Canada, however,
appears to be an entirely different story.

***Insert Table 25 here, Model Parameter Estimates of Returns Volatility,
North America***
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Table 25 provides the results of the persistence or influence of the U.S. national
banking sector index for return volatility over the Canadian national banking sector for
the inclusive period of the study, the entire period prior to the financial crisis and the
period after the financial crisis as can be seen in Panel, A, B, and C respectively. It
should be noted that the U.S. national banking sector index for return volatility influence
over the Canadian banking sector for the overall period as seen in Panel A is similar to
what was found with three of the European country banking sector, where the U.S. has
statistically significant influence over Canada for one and three trading days but not the
second trading day.
Panel B shows that the influence that the U.S. national banking sector index for
return volatility has over the Canadian national banking sector for the entire period prior
to the financial crisis as merely one trading day. This influence remains one trading day
for the period immediately after the financial crisis also.

The U.S. national banking

sector index for return volatility appears to exert the same influence over the Canadian
national banking sector after the financial crisis occurred on September 15, 2008. I can
only speculate that this is due to the extremely close ties of the U.S. and Canadian
banking sectors.

5.8 STATE SPACE ANALYSIS OF RETURNS VOLATILITY

***Insert Table 26, State Space Estimates of Linkages Among Banks Returns Volatility
for the Overall Period***

VARMA converted state space results for returns volatility for the overall period
are reported in Table 26. The results reported in this table indicate extensive volatility
spillovers from countries studied here. For instance, equation (5) indicates that the U.S.
bank returns volatility is influenced at lag one by Australia, Switzerland, the U.K.,
Canada, Hong Kong, and contemporaneously by Australia. The results for the period
before financial crisis are very similar to the overall results and thus not reported here.
Again, we observe extensive volatility spillovers among the countries for this period.
However, the results for after the financial crisis are quite different.

The volatility

spillovers are very much contained during this period. For instance, the U.S. bank returns
volatility was not affected by any other countries. We observe the same phenomenon for
all countries except Germany and Hong Kong that experience limited volatility spillover
after the financial crisis.
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CHAPTER 6
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUTION
The U.S. national banking sector index for returns as well as return volatility are
highly correlated with the other eight major national banking sectors around the globe.
However, the highest pairwise contemporaneous correlations among national banking
sectors were intra-regional as opposed to inter-regional. This could be one of a number
of factors two of which could be similar time-zones that the country banking sector
indices are trading in as well as a more integrated economic trading within the respective
regions.
The U.S. still is the dominate player in the global financial markets exerting its
influence on all eight of the major banking sectors around the globe. However, since the
financial crisis occurred on September 15, 2008, there is evidence that the U.S. influence
has weakened somewhat since then except the the neighbors to the north, Canada.
Canada is the smallest of the banking sectors in this study as well as the closest regionally
to the U.S .banking sector with extremely deep economic ties.
My findings in this study confirms as well as brings to light several interesting
results. Although the major global bank sectors around the world appear to be linked as
was hypothesized, the U.S. banking sector is a global leader and influences other major
banking sectors around the world with regards to returns. However, risk as measured by
return volatility, provides evidence of a more contemporaneous link between the U.S. and
the other eight major global banking sectors.
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Additionally, even though all of the nine major global banking sector countries
are signatories of and in various stages of implementing the numerous Basel accords,
each o f these countries have the governmental power or authority to regulate their
respective banking sectors. I speculate here that this autonomous authority had an impact
on the changes regarding the measured impact of the U.S. national banking sector
immediately following the global financial crisis.
From my findings it appears that the U.S. national banking sector has a strong and
long lasting influence on the other eight major global banking sector countries as
measured by returns when the financial landscape is calm. However, the U.S. influence
appears to evaporate when a financial crisis occurs. Further study could measure to
determine empirically whether there is a return of the U.S. banking sector influence and
is there is, at what point does the U.S. banking sector influence return.
This dissertation adds to the literature in several ways as well as raising more
avenues for further research. A short coming of this study is the examining the actual
governmental actions and the timing of these actions that were taken immediately after
the financial crisis to determine whether those governmental actions or lack of actions in
some cases caused the breakdown in linkages between the U.S. national banking sector
and the other major banking sectors around the globe.
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Table 1
Summary Statistics for Residual Returns
aul

■

SB
B i

swl

gel

frl

ukl

usl

cal

hkl

jal

mam

■
3054

0 .0 2 0 0 8

1 .3 4 1 1 7

6 1 .3 1 9 6 4

-8 .5 1 6 5 8

9 .6 8 9 3 1

3054

-0 .0 0 5 2 6

2 .0 5 8 9 5

- 1 6 .0 5 8 3 8

- 1 2 .1 1 1 9 0

1 9 .7 3 8 3 6

3054

-0 .0 2 2 6 6

2 .3 6 1 1 5

- 6 9 .2 0 3 8 5

-1 7 .7 4 3 7 4

1 8 .7 1 7 6 8

3054

0 .0 1 2 9 1

2 .1 5 7 2 5

3 9 .4 1 8 9 4

-1 4 .7 8 7 0 0

1 9 .2 4 3 7 3

3054

-0 .0 1 2 9 8

1 .9 8 8 5 2

-3 9 .6 5 4 0 6

- 1 6 .9 7 6 9 9

1 8 .8 1 6 3 5

3054

-0 .0 2 9 0 2

2 .4 9 8 9 3

- 8 8 .6 1 9 3 3

-2 3 .6 1 8 5 5

2 2 .0 3 7 8 6

3054

0 .0 3 0 3 5

1 .4 3 4 6 9

9 2 .6 7 5 3 0

-1 4 .0 7 1 1 6

1 2 .1 3 3 9 9

3054

0 .0 2 8 7 2

1 .6 0 9 2 0

8 7 .7 1 2 9 1

-1 4 .5 3 8 4 4

1 5 .9 7 3 9 5

3054

-0 .0 3 2 8 9

2 .0 3 1 6 3

- 1 0 0 .4 3 0 8 8

- 1 3 .3 4 9 8 2

1 4 .1 9 3 2 1

Note: Nine variable descriptions.
aul = Log of daily returns for Australia (S&P/ASX 200 Banking Index)
swl = Log of daily returns for Switzerland (SWXICB Bank Price Index)
gel = Log of daily returns for Germany (Germany CD AX Banks Price Index)
frl = Log of daily returns for France (Euronex Paris CAC Bank 8350)
ukl = Log of daily returns for United Kingdom (FTSE All-Share Bank Index)
usl = Log of daily returns for United States (S&P 500 Banks)
cal = Log of daily returns for Canada (Canada S&P/TSX Banks)
hkl = Log of daily returns for Hong Kong (Hang Seng Financial Index)
ja l = Log of daily returns for Japan (Japan TOPIX Banks)
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Table 2
Summary Statistics for Returns Volatility
sw2

ge2

fr2

uk2

us2

ca2

hk2

ja2

91
9 9

^^9
^^9
91
1191

3054

1 .7 9 8 5 6

5 .1 3 6 6 8

5493

0

9 3 .8 8 2 8 1

3054

4 .2 3 7 9 3

1 4 .2 4 0 9 9

12943

0

3 8 9 .6 0 2 7 6

3054

5 .5 7 3 7 3

1 9 .6 4 9 0 9

17022

0

3 5 0 .3 5 1 5 4

3054

4 .6 5 2 3 6

1 5 .9 2 6 0 5

14208

0

3 7 0 .3 2 0 9 8

3054

3 .9 5 3 0 7

1 4 .0 9 0 5 2

12073

0

3 5 4 .0 5 4 9 5

3054

6 .2 4 3 4 3

2 7 .6 1 6 0 1

19067

0

5 5 7 .8 3 6 1 2

3054

2 .0 5 8 5 8

7 .1 5 9 3 5

6287

0

1 9 7 .9 9 7 4 4

3054

2 .5 8 9 5 0

9 .5 0 8 9 5

7908

0

2 5 5 .1 6 7 1 3

3054

4 .1 2 7 2 3

1 0 .3 6 4 8 4

12605

0

2 0 1 .4 4 7 2 6

Note: Nine variable descriptions.
au2 = Log of daily return volatility for Australia (S&P/ASX 200 Banking Index)
sw2 = Log o f daily return volatility for Switzerland (SWXICB Bank Price Index)
ge2 = Log of daily return volatility for Germany (Germany CD AX Banks Price
Index)
fr2 = Log of daily return volatility for France (Euronex Paris CAC Bank 8350)
uk2 = Log of daily return volatility for United Kingdom (FTSE All-Share Bank
Index)
us2 = Log of daily return volatility for United States (S&P 500 Banks)
ca2 = Log of daily return volatility for Canada (Canada S&P/TSX Banks)
hk2 = Log of daily return volatility for Hong Kong (Hang Seng Financial Index)
ja2 = Log of daily return volatility for Japan (Japan TOPIX Banks)
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Table 3
Correlation Matrix for Residual Returns

■
■

BBB3
1 .0 0 0 0 0

0 .3 1 5 6 4

0 .3 1 5 6 4

0 .2 8 6 1 1

0 .3 2 3 5 0

0 .2 9 9 9 1

0 .0 9 0 4 5

0 .1 6 9 5 5

0 .4 3 5 3 2

0 .3 4 3 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

1 .0 0 0 0 0

0 .7 3 9 7 8

0 .6 8 8 7 3

0 .7 0 7 3 0

0 .3 7 9 1 7

0 .3 9 4 4 8

0 .3 3 9 3 7

0 .2 6 9 5 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

1 .0 0 0 0 0

0 .7 1 6 3 5

0 .6 9 9 8 8

0 .4 0 6 9 5

0 .3 8 5 5 2

0 .2 9 7 9 6

0 .2 4 1 4 8

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

1 .0 0 0 0 0

0 .6 7 8 4 2

0 .3 5 7 5 7

0 .3 0 4 0 5

0 .3 3 1 9 6

0 .2 3 4 0 3

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

1 .0 0 0 0 0

0 .3 8 9 7 1

0 .3 7 4 1 7

0 .3 7 6 3 1

0 .2 3 3 3 6

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

1 .0 0 0 0 0

0 .5 3 1 4 7

0 .0 7 7 9 2

0 .0 3 1 7 0

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

0 .0 7 9 8

1 .0 0 0 0 0

0 .1 9 8 9 9

0 .1 4 0 5 7

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

1 .0 0 0 0 0

0 .3 9 8 7 1

< .0 0 0 1

B
u
n
1

0 .2 8 6 1 1

0 .7 3 9 7 8

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

0 .3 2 3 5 0

0 .6 8 8 7 3

0 .7 1 6 3 5

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

0 .2 9 9 9 1

0 .7 0 7 3 0

0 .6 9 9 8 8

0 .6 7 8 4 2

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

0 .0 9 0 4 5

0 .3 7 9 1 7

0 .4 0 6 9 5

0 .3 5 7 5 7

0 .3 8 9 7 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

0 .1 6 9 5 5

0 .3 9 4 4 8

0 .3 8 5 5 2

0 .3 0 4 0 5

0 .3 7 4 1 7

0 .5 3 1 4 7

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

0 .4 3 5 3 2

0 .3 3 9 3 7

0 .2 9 7 9 6

0 .3 3 1 9 6

0 .3 7 6 3 1

0 .0 7 7 9 2

0 .1 9 8 9 9

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

0 .3 4 3 0 1

0 .2 6 9 5 1

0 .2 4 1 4 8

0 .2 3 4 0 3

0 .2 3 3 3 6

0 .0 3 1 7 0

0 .1 4 0 5 7

0 .3 9 8 7 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

0 .0 7 9 8

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1
1 .0 0 0 0 0

.......................... . J

Note: Each entry in this table represents the contemporaneous correlation coefficient of
the log of the daily returns between a pair of countries for the entire data set period of
January 4, 1999 through September 24, 2010.
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Table 4
Granger-Causality Wald Test for Residual Returns,
Pacific Rim Countries
This Granger-causality test provides a directional causation test providing evidence of
whether the U.S. national banking sector index is influencing or exerting directional
momentum on the other respective national banking sector indices or vice versa. Each
country is paired with the U.S. national banking sector index to determine whether the
U.S. index influences the respective national banking sector indices or vice versa.
Country

Chi-Square

Pr > Chi-Square

Panel A: Entire Period. N = 3,054
Australia
U.S.

600.67
6.53

< .0 0 0 1
0.0884

Hong Kong
U.S.

554.19
8.83

< .0 0 0 1
0.0317

Japan
U.S.

262.66
2.73

< .0 0 0 1
0.4354

Panel B: Period prior to Financial Crisis. N = 2.525
Australia
U.S.

490.08
5.00

<.0001
0.1721

Hong Kong
U.S.

502.81
12.23

<.0001
0.0066

Japan
U.S.

152.30
7.20

<.0001
0.0657

Panel C: Period after the Financial Crisis. N = 529
Australia
U.S.

118.45
1.60

<.0001
0.6593

Hong Kong
U.S.

98.97
1.63

<.0001
0.6519

Japan
U.S.

88.97
2.17

< .0001
0.5384
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Table 5
Granger-Causality Wald Test for Residual Returns,
European Countries
This Granger-causality test provides a directional causation test providing evidence of
whether the U.S. national banking sector index is influencing or exerting directional
momentum on the other respective national banking sector indices or vice versa. Each
country is paired with the U.S. national banking sector index to determine this causal
connection.
Country

Chi-Square

Pr > Chi-Square

Panel A: Entire Period, N = 3.054
France
U.S.

300.33
2.93

< .0 0 0 1
0.4018

Germany
U.S.

180.19
4.98

< .0 0 0 1
0.1734

Switzerland
U.S.

244.84
6.37

< .0 0 0 1
0.0948

U.K.
U.S.

270.38
6.32

< .0 0 0 1

0.0972

Panel B: Period prior to Financial Crisis, N = 2.525
France
U.S.

409.20
14.68

<

Germany
U.S.

176.91

< .0 0 0 1
0.0067

Switzerland
U.S.

349.88

U.K.
U.S.

307.31
4.65

1 2 .2 0

2 .1 0

.0 0 0 1

0 .0 0 2 1

< .0 0 0 1
0.5520
< .0 0 0 1
0.1997
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Table 5 (Cont’d)
Granger-Causality Wald Test for Residual Returns,
European Countries
This Granger-causality test provides a directional causation test providing evidence of
whether the U.S. national banking sector index is influencing or exerting directional
momentum on the other respective national banking sector indices or vice versa. Each
country is paired with the U.S. national banking sector index to determine this causal
connection.
Country

Chi-Square

Pr > Chi-Square

Panel C: Period after the Financial Crisis. N = 529
France
U.S.

33.21
0.52

Germany
U.S.

26.78
3.26

Switzerland
US

29.80
8 .0 1

< .0 0 0 1
0.0457

UK
US

37.90
5.70

< .0 0 0 1
0.1270

< .0 0 0 1

0.9150
< .0 0 0 1

0.3539
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Table 6
Granger-Causality Wald Test for Residual Returns, North America
This Granger-causality test provides a directional causation test providing evidence of
whether the U..S national banking sector index is influencing or exerting directional
momentum on the other respective national banking sector indices or vice versa. Each
country is paired with the U.S. national banking sector index to determine whether the
U.S. index influences the respective national banking sector indices or vice versa.
Country

Chi-Square

Pr > Chi-Square

Panel A: Entire Period, N = 3.054
Canada
U.S.

84.85
10.91

< .0001
0.0122

Panel B: Period prior to Financial Crisis, N - 2.525
Canada
U.S.

19.21
0.87

< .0001
0.8328

Panel C: Period after the Financial Crisis, N = 529
Canada
U.S.

45.35
7.12

<.0001
0.0683
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Table 7
Model Parameter Estimates of Residual Returns for Overall Period,
Pacific Rim Countries
Country

Lag

Estimate

Std Error

t-value
(Pr > |t|)

Variable

0.21599

0.00900

23.99
(0.0001)

U S l(t-l)

0.03036

0.00991

3.07
(0.0022)

USl(t-2)

0.04782

0.00981

4.88
(0.0001)

USl(t-3)

0.24847

0.01085

22.91
(0 .0001)

U S l(t-l)

0.09676

0.01184

8.18
(0.0001)

USl(t-2)

0.02707

0.01176

2.30
(0.0214)

USl(t-3)

0.22912

0.01418

16.16
(0.0001)

U S l(t-l)

0.03062

0.01485

2.06
(0.0393)

USl(t-2)

0.01944

0.01476

1.32
(0.1881)

USl(t-3)

Entire Period. N = 3.054
Australia

Hong Kong

Japan

1

55

Table 8
Model Parameter Estimates of Residual Returns for Period Prior to
Financial Crisis, Pacific Rim Countries
Country

Lag

Estimate

Std Error

t-value
(Pr > |t|)

Variable

0.01193

21.62

U S l(t-l)

Period prior to Financial Crisis. N = 2.525
Australia

1

0.25785

(0 .0001)

Hong Kong

Japan

2

0.02941

0.01294

2.27
(0.0231)

USl(t-2)

3

0.06775

0.01301

5.21
(0 .0001)

USl(t-3)

0.30987

0.01422

21.80
(0 .0001 )

U S l(t-l)

0.07507

0.01548

4.85
(0.0001)

USl(t-2)

0.05218

0.01553

3.36
(0.0008)

USl(t-3)

0.26178

0.02148

12.19

U S l(t-l)

( 0 .0001 )

0.02623

0.02207

1.19
(0.2349)

USl(t-2)

0.00666

0.02214

0.30
(0.7637)

USl(t-3)
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Table 9
Model Parameter Estimates of Residual Returns for Period after
Financial Crisis, Pacific Rim Countries
Country

Lag

Estimate

Std Error

t-value
(P r> |t|)

Variable

0.19208

0.01848

10.39
(0 .0001)

U S l(t-l)

0.02568

0.02082

1.23
(0.2180)

USl(t-2)

0.03329

0.02028

1.64
(0.1013)

USl(t-3)

0.21215

0.02245

9.45
(0 .0001 )

U S l(t-l)

0.10366

0.02484

4.17
( 0 .0001)

USl(t-2)

0.01798

0.02433

0.74
(0.4603)

USl(t-3)

0.20400

0.02216

9.21
(0.0001)

U S l(t-l)

0.04016

0.02419

1.66
(0.0975)

USl(t-2)

0.04774

0.02383

2.00
(0.0457)

USl(t-3)

Period after the Financial Crisis, N = 529
Australia

Hong Kong

Japan

1
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Table 10
Model Parameter Estimates of Residual Returns for Overall Period,
European Countries
Country

Lag

Estimate

Std Error

t-value
(Pr > |t|)

Variable

0.28056

0.01634

17.17
(0 .0001 )

U S l(t-l)

0.07302

0.01747

4.18
(0 .0001 )

USl(t-2)

0.04885

0.01705

2.86
(0.0042)

USl(t-3)

0.24941

0.01862

13.40
(0 .0001 )

U S l(t-l)

0.06674

0.01952

3.42
(0.0006)

USl(t-2)

0.00999

0.01909

0.52
(0.6006)

USl(t-3)

0.24468

0.01580

15.49
( 0 .0001)

U S l(t-l)

0.07034

0.01680

4.19
(0.0001)

USl(t-2)

0.04410

0.01638

2.69
(0.0071)

USl(t-3)

0.25005

0.01537

16.26
( 0 .0001 )

U S l(t-l)

0.05155

0.01642

3.14
(0.0017)

USl(t-2)

0.04591

0.01601

2.87
(0.0042)

USl(t-3)

Entire Period. N = 3.054
France

Germany

Switzerland

U.K.

1
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Table 11
Model Parameter Estimates of Residual Returns for Period Prior to
Financial Crisis, European Countries
Country

Lag

Estimate

Std Error

t-value
(Pr > |t|)

Variable

0.37810

0.01889

20.02
(0 .0001)

U S l(t-l)

0.08493

0.02036

4.17
(0 .0001 )

USl(t-2)

0.02365

0.02036

1.16
(0.2455)

USl(t-3)

0.28215

0.02138

13.20
(0 .0001)

U S l(t-l)

0.06263

0.02210

2.83
(0.0046)

USl(t-2)

0.00176

0.02216

0.08
(0.9365)

USl(t-3)

0.36015

0.01934

18.62
(0.0001)

U S l(t-l)

0.06210

0.02070

3.00
(0.0027)

USl(t-2)

0.02030

0.02066

0.98
(0.3259)

USl(t-3)

Period prior to Financial Crisis, N - 2.525
France

Germany

Switzerland
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Table 11 (Cont’d)
Model Parameter Estimates of Residual Returns for Period Prior to
Financial Crisis, European Countries
Country

Lag

Estimate

Std Error

t-value
(Pr > |t|)

Variable

0.32016

0.01839

17.41
( 0 .0001)

U S l(t-l)

0.07196

0.01951

3.69
( 0 .0002)

USl(t-2)

0.02488

0.01953

1.27
(0.2028)

USl(t-3)

Period prior to Financial Crisis, N = 2.525
U.K.
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Table 12
Model Parameter Estimates of Residual Returns for Period after
Financial Crisis, European Countries
Country

Lag

Estimate

Std Error

t-value
(Pr > |t|)

Variable

0.20299

0.03847

5.28
(0.0001)

U S l(t-l)

0.05031

0.04105

1.23
(0.2209)

USl(t-2)

0.07092

0.03930

1.80
(0.0717)

USl(t-3)

0.22182

0.04417

5.02
(0 .0001)

U S l(t-l)

0.08368

0.04705

1.78
(0.0759)

USl(t-2)

0.02203

0.04498

0.49
(0.6246)

USl(t-3)

0.15793

0.03417

4.62
( 0 .0001 )

U S l(t-l)

0.08085

0.03624

2.23
(0.0261)

USl(t-2)

0.08404

0.03478

2.42
(0.0160)

USl(t-3)

Period after the Financial Crisis. N = 529
France

Germany

Switzerland
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Table 12 (Cont’d)
Model Parameter Estimates of Residual Returns for Period after
Financial Crisis, European Countries
Country

Lag

Estimate

Std Error

t-value
(P r> |t|)

Variable

0.19537

0.03511

5.56
( 0 .0001 )

U S l(t-l)

0.03413

0.03789

0.90
(0.3682)

U Sl(t-2)

0.05956

0.03613

1.65
(0.0998)

USl(t-3)

Period after the Financial Crisis, N = 529
U.K.
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Table 13
Model Parameter Estimates of Residual Returns,
North America
Country

Estimate

Std Error

t-value
(Pr > |t|)

Variable

1

0.08507

0.01230

6.92
(0.0001)

U S l(t-l)

2

0.07690

0.01254

6.13
(0.0001)

USl(t-2)

3

0.05382

0.01238

4.35
(0.0001)

USl(t-3)

Lag

Panel A: Entire Period, N = 3,054
Canada

Panel B: Period prior to Financial Crisis, N = 2,525
Canada

1

0.06513

0.01671

3.90
(0 .0001)

U S l(t-l)

2

0.01964

0.01676

1.17
(0.2414)

USl(t-2)

3

0.03388

0.01685

2.01
(0.0444)

USl(t-3)

Panel C: Period after the Financial Crisis, N = 529
Canada

1

0.10913

0.02460

4.44
( 0 .0001 )

U S l(t-l)

2

0.13436

0.02560

5.25
(0.0001)

USl(t-2)

3

0.08083

0.02502

3.23
(0.0013)

USl(t-3)
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TABLE 14

State Space Estimates of Linkages Among Banks Returns for the
Overall Period
(1)
SWt = -0.1549 Au***t-i + 0.2188 SW ***,., - 0.0940 FR** t-i + 0.5331 US***,.i +
0.2695
CA*’*,., - 0.0897 JA*’*,., -2.0596 AU***, + rn,t
(2)

GR, =-0.07224 Au**,., + 0.1322 SW ’**,., - 0.1253 FR*" t-i + 0.3054 US*** ,., + ri2>t

(3)
FR, = -0.0705 Au***,., + 0.0757 SW **,., - 0.2168 FR***,., + 0.0661 U K *",, +
0.1222 US***,.i + 0.1308 CA***,., + rp,t
(4)
UK, = -0.0818 Au*,., + 0.1675 SW ***,., - 0.0846 FR*** ,., + 0.4560 US***,., + 0.1796
CA***,., - 0.0926 JA***,., -1.450 AU***, + r| 4 ;t
(5)

US, = -0.0704 FR***,.,- 0.1983 U S * * * -0.1026 CA**,, + r|5,t
4. A *

(6 ) CA, = 0.1526 SW
AU***t + Tie,,
(7)

4*

4*4

, , + 0.0593 UK , , + 0.1540 US

4,

AAA

„ - 0 .0 8 8 8 HK

,.,-0 .6 4 2 9

HK, = -.0545 GR * * * + 0.2655 UK***,., - 0.0731 HK***,, + 1.0392 AU***, + tp.,
AAA

AAA

(8 )
JA, =-0.0803Au „ + 0.1045 SW ,., +0.0764 GR
US***,.,-0.0794 HK**,., - 0.7309 AU**, + r |8),
AAA

AAA

A AA

a

,., +0.1253 UK

AA

AA A

,., +0.2716

AAA

(9)
AU, = - 0.0187 FR ,., -0.06693 US ,.,- 0.0343 CA ,., + 0.0310 HK ,., +
0.3381 AU***t + 0.0847***
+ 0.0629*** 1 1 4 ,, + 0.1501*** rjs,, + 0.0744*** ^ 5 ,, - 0.0864***-n7,t
- 0.0353***t|g,t + r| 9 ;,
Notes:
*** indicates that result is significant at the 1 percent level
indicates that result is significant at the 5 percent level
SW = Switzerland bank return
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Table 15
Correlation Matrix for Returns Volatility

■
■
1 .0 0 0 0 0

0 .4 7 4 8 5

0 .4 7 4 8 5

0 .2 9 5 4 3

0 .3 6 8 9 6

0 .3 8 3 2 5

0 .2 1 3 4 7

0 .2 4 2 8 7

0 .3 3 7 2 4

0 .3 0 8 8 2

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

1 .0 0 0 0 0

0 .6 5 7 2 1

0 .6 1 6 0 1

0 .6 4 0 7 4

0 .3 3 9 5 2

0 .3 0 5 8 2

0 .3 5 0 5 4

0 .3 0 9 3 5

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

1 .0 0 0 0 0

0 .6 0 1 3 4

0 .5 6 5 7 4

0 .4 4 0 2 3

0 .3 1 4 7 9

0 .4 5 1 5 2

0 .3 0 8 3 7

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

1 .0 0 0 0 0

0 .6 5 6 6 4

0 .3 5 2 1 2

0 .1 9 6 2 0

0 .3 7 3 1 6

0 .2 1 8 7 7

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

1 .0 0 0 0 0

0 .3 3 8 5 0

0 .2 1 1 1 3

0 .3 1 3 7 4

0 .2 6 3 3 5

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

1 .0 0 0 0 0

0 .3 8 5 2 3

0 .1 7 6 6 6

0 .1 0 5 7 3

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

1 .0 0 0 0 0

0 .2 5 6 6 3

0 .2 7 3 5 6

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

1 .0 0 0 0 0

0 .3 9 3 9 6

< .0 0 0 1

g

g

m u

g

g

0 .2 9 5 4 3

0 .6 5 7 2 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

0 .3 6 8 9 6

0 .6 1 6 0 1

0 .6 0 1 3 4

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

0 .3 8 3 2 5

0 .6 4 0 7 4

0 .5 6 5 7 4

0 .6 5 6 6 4

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

0 .2 1 3 4 7

0 .3 3 9 5 2

0 .4 4 0 2 3

0 .3 5 2 1 2

0 .3 3 8 5 0

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

0 .2 4 2 8 7

0 .3 0 5 8 2

0 .3 1 4 7 9

0 .1 9 6 2 0

0 .2 1 1 1 3

0 .3 8 5 2 3

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

0 .3 3 7 2 4

0 .3 5 0 5 4

0 .4 5 1 5 2

0 .3 7 3 1 6

0 .3 1 3 7 4

0 .1 7 6 6 6

0 .2 5 6 6 3

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

0 .3 0 8 8 2

0 .3 0 9 3 5

0 .3 0 8 3 7

0 .2 1 8 7 7

0 .2 6 3 3 5

0 .1 0 5 7 3

0 .2 7 3 5 6

0 .3 9 3 9 6

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1

< .0 0 0 1
1 .0 0 0 0 0

Note: Each entry in this table represents the contemporaneous correlation coefficient of
the log of the daily returns volatility between a pair of countries for the entire data set
period of January 4, 1999 through September 24, 2010.
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Table 16
Granger-Causality Wald Test for Returns Volatility,
Pacific Rim Countries
This Granger-causality test provides a directional causation test providing evidence of
whether the U.S. national banking sector index is influencing or exerting directional
momentum on the other respective national banking sector indices or vice versa. Each
country is paired with the U.S. national banking sector index to determine whether the
U.S. index influences the respective national banking sector indices or vice versa.
Country

Chi-Square

Pr > Chi-Square

Panel A: Entire Period. N = 3.054
228.31
82.76

<
<

Hong Kong
U.S.

31.13
46.49

<
<

Japan
U.S.

68.71
29.52

<
<

Australia
U.S.

.0 0 0 1
.0 0 0 1

.0 0 0 1
.0 0 0 1

.0 0 0 1
.0 0 0 1

Panel B: Period prior to Financial Crisis. N = 2.525
Australia
U.S.

179.39
107.63

<
<

Hong Kong
U.S.

35.89
65.72

<
<

Japan
U.S.

29.57
15.29

< .0 0 0 1
0.0016

.0 0 0 1
.0 0 0 1

.0 0 0 1
.0 0 0 1

Panel C: Period after the Financial Crisis. N = 529
Australia
U.S.

37.30
11.80

< .0 0 0 1
0.0081

Hong Kong
U.S.

2.38
5.38

0.4933
0.1459

13.30
6.84

0.0040
0.0771

Japan
U.S.
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Table 17
Granger-Causality Wald Test for Returns Volatility,
European Countries
This Granger-causality test provides a directional causation test providing evidence of
whether the U.S. national banking sector index is influencing or exerting directional
momentum on the other respective national banking sector indices or vice versa. Each
country is paired with the U.S. national banking sector index to determine this causal
connection.
Country

Chi-Square

Pr > Chi-Square

Panel A: Entire Period. N = 3,054
France
U.S.

105.54
63.71

Germany
U.S.

9.40
80.17

Switzerland
U.S.

68.84
94.12

U.K.
U.S.

127.40
158.79

< .0 0 0 1

<

.0 0 0 1

0.0244
< .0 0 0 1
< .0 0 0 1

<
<
<

.0 0 0 1

.0 0 0 1
.0 0 0 1

Panel B: Period prior to Financial Crisis. N = 2.525
France
U.S.

77.95
58.99

<
<

Germany
U.S.

42.66
11.95

< .0 0 0 1
0.0076

Switzerland
U.S.

118.82
49.52

<
<

U.K.
U.S.

143.42
64.95

<
<

.0 0 0 1
.0 0 0 1

.0 0 0 1
.0 0 0 1

.0 0 0 1
.0 0 0 1
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Table 17 (Cont’d)
Granger-Causality Wald Test for Returns Volatility,
European Countries
This Granger-causality test provides a directional causation test providing evidence of
whether the U.S. national banking sector index is influencing or exerting directional
momentum on the other respective national banking sector indices or vice versa. Each
country is paired with the U.S. national banking sector index to determine this causal
connection.
Country

Chi-Square

Pr > Chi-Square

Panel C: Period after the Financial Crisis. N = 529
France
U.S.

17.50
8.39

0.0006
0.0386

Germany
U.S.

2.57
14.65

0 .0 0 2 1

Switzerland
U.S.

12.31
8.83

0.0064
0.0316

U.K.
U.S.

17.23
26.26

< .0 0 0 1

0.4625

0.0006
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Table 18
Granger-Causality Wald Test for Returns Volatility, North America
This Granger-causality test provides a directional causation test providing evidence of
whether the US national banking sector index is influencing or exerting directional
momentum on the other respective national banking sector indices or vice versa. Each
country is paired with the US national banking sector index to determine whether the US
index influences the respective national banking sector indices or vice versa.
Country

Chi-Square

Pr > Chi-Square

Panel A: Entire Period. N - 3.054
Canada
U.S.

110.20
70.04

<.0001
<.0001

Panel B: Period prior to Financial Crisis. N = 2.525
Canada
U.S.

16.37
36.37

0.0008
< .0001

Panel C: Period after the Financial Crisis. N = 529
Canada
U.S.

18.79
13.63

0.0003
0.0035
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Table 19
Model Parameter Estimates of Returns Volatility for Overall Period,
Pacific Rim Countries
Country

Lag

Estimate

Std Error

t-value
(P r> jt|)

Variable

0.04143

0.00313

13.22
( 0 .0001 )

US2(t-l)

-0.00118

0.00324

-0.37
(0.7146)

US2(t-2)

0.01684

0.00321

5.24
( 0 .0001 )

US2(t-3)

0.02667

0.00579

4.61
(0 .0001)

US2(t-l)

0.00203

0.00583

0.35
(0.7279)

US2(t-2)

0.01142

0.00578

1.79
(0.0488)

US2(t-3)

0.04564

0.00671

6.80
(0.0001)

US2(t-l)

-0.00607

0.00680

-0.89
(0.3720)

US2(t-2)

0.02370

0.00674

3.52
(0.0004)

US2(t-3)

Entire Period, N = 3.054
Australia

Hong Kong

Japan

1
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Table 20
Model Parameter Estimates of Returns Volatility for Period Prior to
Financial Crisis, Pacific Rim Countries
Country

Lag

Estimate

Std Error

t-value
(Pr > |t|)

Variable

Period prior to Financial Crisis. N = 2.525
Australia

Hong Kong

Japan

1

0.06949

0.00597

11.65
(0.0001)

US2(t-l)

2

-0.00922

0.00616

-1.50
(0.1347)

US2(t-2)

3

0.02935

0.00606

4.84
( 0 .0001 )

US2(t-3)

0.04774

0.00933

5.12
(0 .0001 )

US2(t-l)

-0.00346

0.00938

-0.37
(0.7123)

US2(t-2)

0.01810

0.00931

1.94
(0.0520)

US2(t-3)

0.06963

0.01416

4.92
(0.0001)

US2(t-l)

0.01711

0.01421

1.20
(0.2287)

US2(t-2)

-0.00728

0.01425

-0.51
(0.6092)

US2(t-3)
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Table 21
Model Parameter Estimates of Returns Volatility for Period after
Financial Crisis, Pacific Rim Countries
Country

Lag

Estimate

Std Error

t-value
(Pr > |t|)

Variable

Period after the Financial Crisis. N = 529
Australia

Hong Kong

Japan

1

0.03480

0.00639

5.45
(0 .0 0 0 1 )

US2 (t-1)

2

-0.00159

0.00657

-0.24
(0.8088)

US2(t-2)

3

0.01437

0.00655

2.19
(0.0286)

US2(t-3)

1

0.01759

0.01280

1.37
(0.1700)

US2(t-l)

2

-0.00218

0.01284

-0.17
(0.8654)

US2(t-2)

3

0.00699

0.01278

0.55
(0.5848)

US2(t-3)

1

0.03727

0.01217

3.06
(0.0023)

US2(t-l)

2

-0.01152

0.01233

-0.93
(0.3505)

US2(t-2)

0.02040

0.01225

3

1 .6 6

(0.0966)

US2(t-3)
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Table 22
Model Parameter Estimates o f Returns Volatility for Overall Period,
European Countries
Country

Lag

Estimate

Std Error

t-value
(Pr > |t|)

Variable

0.05984

0.01098

5.45
(0.0001)

US2(t-l)

0.00374

0.01100

0.34
(0.7342)

US2(t-2)

0.08553

0.01092

7.83
( 0 .0001 )

US2(t-3)

0.02486

0.01341

1.85
(0 .0638)

US2(t-l)

-0.02933

0.01337

-2.19
(0.0283)

US2(t-2)

0.01802

0.01329

1.36
(0.1752)

US2(t-3)

0.07007

0.00938

7.47
( 0 .0001)

US2(t-l)

0.00985

0.00946

1.04
(0.2977)

US2(t-2)

0.04630

0.00940

4.93
( 0 .0001 )

US2(t-3)

0.09782

0.00950

10.29
( 0 .0001 )

US2(t-l)

-0.00136

0.00926

-0.14
(0.8874)

US2(t-2)

0.03578

0.00946

3.78
(0.0002)

US2(t-3)

Entire Period. N = 3.054
France

Germany

Switzerland

U.K.

1
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Table 23
Model Parameter Estimates of Returns Volatility for Period Prior to
Financial Crisis, European Countries
Country

Lag

Estimate

Std Error

t-value
(Pr > |t|)

Variable

Period prior to Financial Crisis. N = 2,525
France

Germany

1

0.10200

0.01440

7.08
(0.0001)

US2(t-l)

2

0.05520

0.01450

3.81
(0.0001)

US2(t-2)

3

-0.01136

0.014668

-0.78
(0.4382)

US2(t-3)

0.08910

0.01354

6.05
(0 .0001)

US2(t-l)

0.01831

0.01360

1.35
(0.1785)

US2(t-2)

-0.01515

0.01370

1.11

US2(t-3)

-

(0.2689)
Switzerland

0.12403

0.01201

10.32
(0.0001)

US2(t-l)

0.01836

0.01224

1.50
(0.1338)

US2(t-2)

-0.00486

0.01224

-0.40
(0.6914)

US2(t-3)
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Table 23 (Cont’d)
Model Parameter Estimates of Returns Volatility for Period Prior to
Financial Crisis, European Countries
Country

Lag

Estimate

Std Error

t-value
(Pr > |t|)

Variable

0.10713

0.01013

10.57
(0.0001)

US2(t-l)

0.03714

0.01033

3.79
( 0 .0002 )

US2(t-2)

-0.009680

0.01042

-0.93
(0.3526)

US2(t-3)

Period prior to Financial Crisis. N = 2,525
U.K.
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Table 24
Model Parameter Estimates of Returns Volatility for Period after
Financial Crisis, European Countries
Country

Lag

Estimate

Std Error

t-value
(P r> |t|)

Variable

0.04729

0.02549

1.86
(0.0642)

US2(t-l)

-0.01370

0.02548

-0.54
(0.5911)

US2(t-2)

0.09081

0.02528

3.59
(0.0004)

US2(t-3)

0.00055

0.03304

0.02
(0 .9866)

US2(t-l)

-0.05266

0.03293

-1.60
(0.1104)

US2(t-2)

0.00218

0.03279

0.07
(0.9469)

US2(t-3)

0.05715

0.02171

2.63
(0.0087)

US2(t-l)

0.00210

0.02185

0.10
(0.9234)

US2(t-2)

0.04561

0.02172

2.10
(0.0362)

US2(t-3)

Period after the Financial Crisis. N = 529
France

Germany

Switzerland

1
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Table 24 (Cont’d)
Model Parameter Estimates of Returns Volatility for Period after
Financial Crisis, European Countries
Country

Lag

Estimate

Std Error

t-value
(Pr > |t|)

Variable

Period after the Financial Crisis. N —529
U.K.

1

0.08853

0.02326

3.81
(0.0002)

US2(t-l)

2

-0.01514

0.02345

-0.65
(0.5188)

US2(t-2)

3

0.03261

0.02305

1.41
(0.1578)

US2(t-3)
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Table 25
Model Parameter Estimates o f Returns Volatility,
North America
Country
Lag
Estimate
Std Error
t-value
Variable
_________________________________________________________(P r> lt|)____________
Panel A: Entire Period. N = 3,054
Canada

1

0.04511

0.00498

9.05
(0.0001)

US2(t-l)

2

0.00366

0.00502

0.73
(0.4664)

US2(t-2)

3

0.02058

0.00498

4.13
(0 .0001)

US2(t-3)

Panel B: Period prior to Financial Crisis. N = 2,525
Canada

1

0.02699

0.00692

3.90
( 0 .0 0 0 1 )

US2(t-l)

2

0.00478

0.00692

0.69
(0.4896)

US2(t-2)

3

-0.00320

0.00696

-0.46
(0.6458)

US2(t-3)

3.84
( 0 .0001)

US2(t-l)

Panel C: Period after the Financial Crisis. N = 529
Canada

1

0.04474

0.01165

2

-0.00139

0.01175

-0.12
(0.9059)

US2(t-2)

3

0.02077

0.01164

1.78
(0.0751)

US2(t-3)
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TABLE 26

State Space Estimates of Linkages Among Banks Returns Volatility for
the Overall Period

(1) SW2t = -0.1127 AU2*\-i -0.1013 SW2 **\_, -0.0326 GR2**t4 + 0.1464 CA2**\.i +
0.2370 HK2***t-i - 0.0897 JA2***t4 +2.464 AU2***t + q ,,
**

***

***

(2) GR2t =-1.2248 AU2 t-i -0.3397 SW2
t., -0.1484 GR2 t4 + 0.1380 UK2
0.1810 US2***t-i +0.4755 HK2***t4 + 0.2406 JA2*"., + 6.5321 AU2***t+£>,t

t4-

(3)
FR2, = -0.4673 AU2
-0.2832 SW2 t4 -0.0802 FR2 t-i + 0.1444 UK2
0.0551 US2***t4 + 0.1720 CA2***t4 + 0.2710 HK2***t., + 3.1182 AU2***t + q3>t
4s Jfc&

444

t- i-

4t4s4s

(4) UK2t = -0.4992 AU2 t4 -0.1983 SW2 M -0.1260 GR2 M+0.0520 FR2 t-i +
0.0872 UK2***t-i + 0.0912 CA2*** t4 + 0.2333 HK2***M - 0.0926 JA2***t4 + 2.795 AU2***t +
?4,t
(5) US2t = -0.4559 AU2***t.i -0.2651 SW2***m + 0.3279 UK2**\-i -0.0603 US2***t4
+0.1574 CA2**M +0.2871 HK2***t4 + 4.7166 AU2***t + q s,t
4c344c

* 4

(6) CA2t = 0.0785 SW2
t4 +0.0204 FR2 M -0.0366 CA2 t4 + 0.1137 HK2
JA2 ***t4 + 0.9263 AU2***t + g6>,

t4 -0.0324

(7) HK, = -0.4025 AU2***t., -0.1459 GR2 ***t4 -0.0609 FR2*’t.i -0.0366 CA2**,_i + 0.3251
HK2 t_! + 0.1507 JA2 t., + 0.9263 AU2 t + g?,t
&4t 4*

***

4c4(34

(8)
JA2t = -0.4616 AU2***t-i -0.0533 GR2*’*t4 + 0.0359 UK2**,4 -0.0503 US2*** M 0.1340 HK2***t4 +0.0598 JA2***t4 +2.4050 AU2**t + qiJt
(9)
AU, = -0.1349 AU2***t-i -0.0581 SW2***t4 -0.02161 GR2**Vi + 0.0186 FR2***t_, 0.0290 US2***t-i -0.0228 CA2***t4 +0.0620 HK2***t4 + 0.0129 JA2**t4+ 1.3445 AU2***t +
0.1410 g., +0.0580 g2>t +0.0182 g3,t -0.0157 t4 g4,t + 0.0270 q^ + 0.0380 g7. t 0.0543*** ^8>t + s 9it
A **

*44

444

444

Notes:
*** indicates that result is significant at the 1 percent level
** indicates that result is significant at the 5 percent level
SW2 = Switzerland bank return volatility

444

444
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